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Abstract
This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externali-
ties by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model. In professional
team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that enables spon-
sors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network e¤ects
operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while positive or negative network
e¤ects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. Clubs react to these network
e¤ects by charging higher (lower) prices to sponsors (fans). The size of these network
e¤ects also determines the level of competitive balance within the league. We further
show that clubs benet from stronger combined network e¤ects through higher prots
and that network externalities can mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on
competitive balance. Finally, we derive implications for improving competitive balance
by taking advantage of network externalities.
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1 Introduction
The professional team sports industry has a unique organizational structure. It is the only
industry in which production is organized by leagues. This unique organizational structure
is the result of the industry-specic production and competition process. Industry outsiders
often tend to regard individual teams as rms and treat them as production units. Unlike an
automobile rm, however, an individual team cannot produce a marketable product. Each
team needs at least one opponent to play a match. However, even a match between two teams
is not an attractive product. The individual matches must be upgraded by integrating them
into an organized championship race. This upgrade, which gives each individual match
additional value within the larger context of the championship race, is managed by the
league.
From a sports perspective, each team within a league wants to win as many games
as possible. Economically, however, teams are not so much competitors but are rather
complementors. The quality or economic value of the championship race depends to a large
extent on the level of competitive balance. Unlike Toyota and Ford, which prefer weak
competitors in their industry, sports teams like Real Madrid, the New York Yankees, and
the Dallas Cowboys benet from having strong opponents within their leagues. A more
balanced league usually produces a more attractive - that is, economically more valuable -
product.1
The clubscompetition provides the platform for the interaction of various market sides
such as fans, advertisers and sponsors, the media, and merchandising companies. These
interactions via an intermediary platform creates what is called a "multisided market." Each
of the distinct market sides demands a specic good or service provided by the intermediary.
Frequently, the market sides do not interact with each other directly; however, they exert
network externalities on each other. These externalities inuence the markets demand
structure and the intermediarys pricing schemes.
Fans demand competition and the experience of a sports event, advertisers and spon-
sors demand an audience that they can inform about their products or services, the media
demand an audience willing to pay for the use of their services, merchandising companies
demand customers who want to buy their articles, etc. An interaction between two market
sides only takes place because of the underlying sports event. Fans would hardly consume
advertisement content if there were not a match taking place that featured their favorite
1According to the so-called uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (Rottenberg, 1956), fans prefer to
attend games with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close championship races. For empirical contributions
that analyze the relation between competitive balance and match attendance, see Downward and Dawson
(2000), Borland and MacDonald (2003) and Szymanski (2003).
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team. Merchandising companies would sell many fewer fan articles if their products were
not linked to an active sports team, and so on. These examples underline the importance of
the clubscompetition to act as a platform for the di¤erent market sides that interact and
exert network externalities on each other.
We add to the literature by contributing to two di¤erent strands of literature: on the one
hand, the literature on multisided markets and on the other hand, the literature on analytical
models of sports leagues. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to integrate the theory
of two-sided markets into a contest model of a professional team sports league. Our model
can then be used as a basic framework to analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent cross-subsidization
schemes in team sports leagues.
In particular, this paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network
externalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a two-stage contest model.
In professional team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that en-
ables sponsors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network
e¤ects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while positive or negative network
e¤ects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market.2 Clubs react to these network
externalities by charging lower prices to fans and, under certain conditions, higher prices
to sponsors. Our analysis shows that the size of these network externalities determines the
level of competitive balance within the league. Depending on the market potential of the
sponsors, competitive balance increases (small market potential) or decreases (large market
potential) with stronger combined network e¤ects. Traditional models that do not take net-
work externalities into account, thus under- or overestimate the actual level of competitive
balance, which may lead to wrong policy implications. Moreover, we show that clubs ben-
et from the presence of network externalities because club prots increase with stronger
combined network e¤ects.
The paper is of interest to policy-makers in a professional team sports league because we
derive recommendations of how to improve competitive balance by taking advantage of net-
work externalities. Our model suggests that an increase in the market potential of sponsors
produces a more balanced league because the small club will increase its talent investments
more than the large club in equilibrium. Finally, we show that network externalities can
mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. In Section
3, we present our model with its notation and main assumptions. We specify fan and
sponsor demand, the quality of the competition and club prots. In Section 4, we solve
2See Becker and Murphy (1993) for a discussion on advertisements as a good or bad. For further analysis
of advertisements see, e.g., Depken and Wilson (2004) and Reisinger et al. (2009).
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the two-stage game, derive the subgame-perfect equilibria and discuss the results. Section
5 highlights policy implications regarding competitive balance and revenue sharing. Finally,
Section 6 points out possible extensions and concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Economists have designed various models of sports leagues. In an early contribution, El-
Hodiri and Quirk (1971) developed a dynamic decision-making model of a professional sports
league and incorporated certain fundamental features of the North American sports industry
such as the reserve clause, player drafts and the sale of player contracts among teams.
They show that revenue sharing does not inuence competitive balance and thus conrm
the "invariance proposition".3 Fort and Quirk (1995) derive similar results in an updated,
static version of the El-Hodiri and Quirk model. Atkinson et al. (1988) contradict the
invariance proposition and show that revenue sharing can improve competitive balance. In
their model, Atkinson et al. adopt a pool-sharing arrangement and a club revenue function
that depends on the teams performance and on the performance of all other teams. Their
result is supported by Marburger (1997), who builds his model on the assumption that fans
care about the relative and absolute quality of teams. Vrooman (1995) shows that sharing
the winning-elastic revenue does not a¤ect competitive balance, while sharing the winning-
inelastic revenue does improve competitive balance. Késenne (2000b) develops a two-team
model consisting of a large- and a small-market club and shows that a payroll cap, dened as a
xed percentage of league revenue divided by the number of teams, will improve competitive
balance as well as the distribution of player salary within the league (c.f. Késenne, 2007).
The recent sports economics literature has suggested modeling a team sports league by
making use of contest theory.4 In his seminal article, Szymanski (2003) applied Tullocks
(1980) rent-seeking contest to ascertain the optimal design of sports leagues. Based on
a model of two prot-maximizing clubs and a club revenue function that depends on the
relative quality of the home team, Szymanski and Késenne (2004) show that gate revenue
sharing decreases competitive balance. This result is driven by the so-called dulling e¤ect.
The dulling e¤ect describes the well-known fact in sports economics that revenue sharing
reduces the incentive to invest in playing talent. Dietl and Lang (2008) conrm this nding
and further show that gate revenue sharing increases social welfare.
3The "invariance proposition" goes back to Rottenberg (1956) and states that the distribution of playing
talent between clubs in professional sports leagues does not depend on the allocation of property rights to
playersservices. See also Vrooman (1996).
4The rst approaches in contest theory were made by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983)
and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983).
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As this brief literature review shows, analytical models in sports are mainly focused
on the e¤ect of cross-subsidization schemes such as reserve clauses, revenue sharing and
salary caps on competitive balance without taking into account that the competition of
the clubs provides the platform for the interaction of various market sides (fans, sponsors,
advertisers and the media). These club-mediated interactions of di¤erent market sides create
a "multisided market."
Research related to multisided markets is ourishing and has been conducted on a broad
range of topics and industries. For instance, software platforms (Evans et al., 2004), payment
systems (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Schmalensee, 2002; Wright, 2003, 2004), the Internet
(Baye and Morgan, 2001; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) and media markets (Crampes et al.,
2009; Reisinger et al., 2009). More general models have been proposed by Rochet and Tirole
(2003), Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Belleamme and Toulemonde
(2009). Despite this large variety of applications, the theory of multisided markets has not
yet been applied to sports leagues. This paper tries to ll this gap.
3 Model Setup
We model a professional team sports league with two clubs, denoted as 1 and 2. The clubs
are asymmetric with respect to their market size - that is, there is one large-market club and
one small-market club. Each club i 2 f1; 2g invests independently a certain amount xi 2 R+0
in playing talent to maximize its prots. Talent is measured in perfectly divisible units that
can be hired at a competitive labor market.
In our model, the competition of the clubs provides the platform that serves as the
intermediary between two groups: fans and sponsors. Fans can consume sports competition
by watching a match, while sponsors are attracted to the competition because sports events
draw large crowds of potential customers and help to build a positive corporate image. The
size of the crowd can then be leveraged through media coverage - an e¤ect that we model
indirectly. The attractiveness of a sports event for sponsors increases with the number of fans
watching. The presence of sponsors, in turn, may have a negative e¤ect on the attractiveness
of the event for the fans. These indirect e¤ects are modeled as network externalities in the
sponsor and fan demand functions.
The timing of the model features a two-stage structure:
1. Stage: Clubs invest independently in playing talent with the objective of maximizing
their own prots. Talent investments determine the win percentages and thus the
quality of the competition of the two clubs.
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2. Stage: Given a certain quality of competition, fans and sponsors make their decisions
taking into account the network externalities that operate from one market side to the
other. Each club then generates its own revenues dependent on the decisions of fans
and sponsors.
In the sections that follow we derive the demand functions of fans and sponsors under
network externalities and specify the quality of the competition. Finally, we derive club
revenues, costs and prots.
3.1 Demand of fans and sponsors under network externalities
We assume that the fans of club i 2 f1; 2g demand the quantity qfi 2 R+0 given by5
qfi = m
f
i  
pfi
i
+ nsqsi ; (1)
while the amount of advertising qsi 2 R+0 that sponsors place at club i 2 f1; 2g is given by6
qsi = m
s   p
s
i
i
+ nfqfi : (2)
The price fans have to pay to be able to watch a match, is denoted by pfi 2 R+0 , while
psi 2 R+0 stands for the price sponsors have to pay for advertisements. Clubs can charge
fans for watching the match by selling tickets and also, indirectly, by collectively or indi-
vidually selling media rights. Through ticket sales, clubs directly generate revenues from
fan attendance. Through media rights sales, clubs indirectly generate revenues from fans by
the sale of the rights to a broadcasting company, which in turn charges its viewers for the
broadcast. In a rst approach, our model includes the media indirectly as a lever for higher
fan attendance. In further research, the media sector could be modeled as a third market
side.
The parameter mfi 2 R+ characterizes the market size of club i. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that club 1 is the large-market club, with a higher drawing potential, and as
a result, a bigger fan base than the small-market club 2, such that mf1 > m
f
2 . Furthermore,
the parameter ms 2 R+ represents the total market potential of the sponsors, or, in the
case of a binding quota for sponsoring dened by the league, the sponsorsbounded market
5See, e.g., Armstrong (2006) who utilizes similar linear demand functions in a two-sided market with
network externalities.
6For the sake of completeness, we dene the demand function of the sponsors qsi to be zero in the case
that there are no fans, i.e., qfi = 0. However, note that q
f
i = 0 will never be an equilibrium outcome.
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potential.7
The network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market are
referred to as "fan-related network externalities" and are denoted by nf 2 [0; 1). We assume
that the fan-related network externalities are positive because more fans imply more publicity
and thus have a positive e¤ect on the demand in the sponsor market. On the other hand, the
network externalities that operate from the sponsor market to the fan market are referred to
as "sponsor-related network externalities" and are denoted by ns 2 ( 1; 1). Thus, we allow
for positive or negative sponsor-related network externalities. However, we assume that the
positive fan-related network externalities are at least as strong as the sponsor-related network
externalities in absolute values, i.e., nf  jnsj. The possibly positive (even though small)
e¤ect of advertising on consumers (see, e.g., Nelson, 1974 and Kotowitz and Mathewson,
1979) reduces the negative sponsor-related network externalities such that the assumption
nf  jnsj is reasonable.8
In general, network externalities can be illustrated by a displacement of the demand
functions qfi and q
s
i . In this respect, stronger network externalities induce stronger displace-
ment of the corresponding demand functions. The combined network e¤ects from fans and
sponsors, denoted by  are given by   nf + ns. A higher nf implies that the positive fan-
related network externalities are relatively more important than the sponsor-related network
externalities, such that the combined network e¤ects increase. Similarly, a higher ns (i.e.,
either weaker negative or stronger positive sponsor-related network externalities) results in
stronger combined network e¤ects. By assuming that nf  jnsj the combined network e¤ects
 are not smaller than zero - i.e.,  2 [0; 2). Consequently,  > 0 describes a situation with
positive combined network e¤ects in which the positive fan-related network externalities are
stronger than the sponsor-related network externalities in absolute values. If  = 0 then the
combined network e¤ects equal zero. In this case, we have either a situation without network
externalities (i.e., nf = ns = 0) or a situation with equalized network externalities in which
both individual network externalities are equal in terms of absolute values (i.e., nf =  ns).
Finally, the parameter i 2 R+ denotes the quality of the competition between club i
against club j and is specied below by equation (5). We assume that a higher quality of the
7Note that the parameter ms has no subscript, because we assume that there is only one homogeneous
group of sponsors in the league o¤ering advertisements to the two types of clubs. The introduction of a club-
specic sponsor with market potential msi at club i would not change the results qualitatively. Moreover,
under a quota on sponsoring one can imagine restrictions on where advertisements may be placed or on the
specic types of companies that are allowed to appear as sponsors in a league.
8A potentially negative externality derived from advertisements could be that fans want to watch sports
events, not advertisements. In the case where the actual sports event is adapted to commercial requirements,
e.g., special advertisement breaks, this aspect becomes even more obvious. For further discussion of this
aspect, see Becker and Murphy (1993), Depken and Wilson (2004) and Reisinger et al. (2009).
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the event (competition of the clubs) has a positive e¤ect on fan demand, but at the same time,
it has also a positive impact on sponsor demand (i.e., @qsi =@i = p
s
i=
2
i + n
f (@qfi =@i) > 0):
there is a positive e¤ect @qfi =@i > 0 through more fans and a positive leverage e¤ect p
s
i=
2
i >
0, because a high quality event draws a larger audience. The media serve as an additional
lever, increasing sponsorsexposure to consumers. Consequently, sponsorsdemand increases
through a higher quality via more media exposure (Borland and MacDonald, 2003 and
Farrelly and Quester, 2003).
3.2 The quality of the competition
Following Dietl and Lang (2008) and Dietl et al. (2009), we assume that the quality of the
competition i depends on two factors: the probability of club is success and the uncertainty
of outcome. Furthermore, we assume that both factors enter the quality function as a linear
combination with equal weights, that is, the quality of the competition is represented by the
combination of the win percentage and the uncertainty of outcome.9
We measure the probability of club is success by the win percentage wi of this club. The
win percentage is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF), which maps the vector
(xi; xj) of talent investment into probabilities for each club. We apply the logit approach,
which is the most widely used functional form of a CSF in sporting contests, and dene the
win percentage wi of club i as10
wi(xi; xj) =
xi
xi + xj
; (3)
where xi  0 characterizes the talent investments of club i = f1; 2g. We dene wi(xi; xj) :=
1=2 if xi = xj = 0. Given that the win percentages must sum up to unity, we obtain the
adding-up constraint: wj = 1 wi with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. Following Szymanski (2004),
we adopt the "Contest-Nash conjectures" and compute the derivative of equation (3) as
@wi=@xi = xj=(xi + xj)
2.11
The uncertainty of outcome is measured by the competitive balance in the league. Follow-
ing Szymanski (2003), Dietl and Lang (2008), and Vrooman (2008), we specify competitive
9We will see below that this specication of the quality function gives rise to a quadratic revenue function
widely used in the sports economic literature.
10The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980). It was subsequently axiomatized by Skaper-
das (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). An alternative functional form would be the probit CSF (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987), the di¤erence-form CSF (Hirshleifer, 1989) and the value weighted CSF (Runkel,
2006). See Dietl, Franck and Lang (2008) and Fort and Winfree (2009) for analyses concerning the e¤ect of
the discriminatory power in the CSF.
11See Szymanski (2004).
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balance CB by the product of the win percentages, i.e.,
CB(xi; xj) = wi(xi; xj)  wj(xi; xj) = xixj
(xi + xj)2
; (4)
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. Note that competitive balance attains its maximum of 1=4 for a
completely balanced league in which both clubs invest the same amount in talent such that
w1 = w2 = 1=2. A less balanced league is then characterized by a lower value of CB.
With the specication of the win percentage given by equation (3) and competitive bal-
ance given by equation (4), club is quality function i as described above is derived as
i(xi; xj) = wi(xi; xj) + wi(xi; xj)  wj(xi; xj) = xi(xi + 2xj)
(xi + xj)2
; (5)
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. A higher win percentage wi of club i induces the quality of
the competition i to increase, albeit with a decreasing rate, which reects the impact of
competitive balance on the quality of the competition, i.e., @i=@wi > 0 and @2i=@w2i < 0.
12
3.3 Derivation of club revenues, costs and prots
Each club generates its own revenues such that total revenue Ri of club i is given by the
sum of fan-related revenue pfi q
f
i and sponsor-related revenue p
s
iq
s
i :
Ri = p
f
i q
f
i + p
s
iq
s
i =
h
mfi   qfi + nsqsi

qfi +

ms   qsi + nfqfi

qsi
i
 i; (6)
with i = 2wi(xi; xj)   wi(xi; xj)2. This club-specic revenue function, which is quadratic
in the win percentage, is widely used in the sports economics literature. For instance,
our revenue is consistent with the revenue functions used in Szymanski (2003, p. 1164).
Moreover, note that club is revenues increase with the quality of the competition i.
By assuming a competitive labor market and following the sports economic literature,
the market clearing cost of a unit of talent, denoted by c, is the same for every club. The
cost function of club i 2 f1; 2g is thus given by C(xi) = cxi, where c is the marginal unit
cost of talent.
The prot function of club i is then given by revenues minus costs and yields
i(xi; xj) = Ri(wi(xi; xj))  C(xi): (7)
12For analyses of competitive balance in sports leagues, see, e.g., Fort and Lee (2007) and Fort and Quirk
(2009).
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with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In the rst stage, clubs decide on their investments in playing talent, considering the cost
of talent and its e¤ect on their win percentage. In the second stage, given the quality of
the competition as determined in stage 1, fans and sponsors make their decisions taking into
account the network externalities. We apply backward induction to solve for the subgame-
perfect equilibria in this two-stage game.
4.1 Stage 2
In this subsection, we characterize the point at which the pricing for fans and sponsors
under network externalities is optimal such that clubs obtain maximum revenue. Clubs
will take into account the relatedness of the fan and sponsor market and thus consider the
consequences of the two distinct network externalities on the pricing decisions and demand
functions. Formally, club i = f1; 2g maximizes its revenue Ri = pfi qfi + psiqsi in stage 2 by
taking the investment decisions made in stage 1 as given. Note that we assume that marginal
costs for sponsors and fans are zero. The equilibrium in prices and quantities in stage 2 is
derived in the next lemma:
Lemma 1 In stage 2, equilibrium prices and quantities for fans and sponsors of club i =
f1; 2g are given by
(bpfi ; bqfi ) =
 
mfi
 
2  nf+ms(ns   nf )
(2  ) (2 + ) i;
2mfi +m
s
(2  ) (2 + )
!
; (8)
(bpsi ; bqsi ) =
 
mfi (n
f   ns) +ms (2  ns)
(2  ) (2 + ) i;
mfi  + 2m
s
(2  ) (2 + )
!
: (9)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In equilibrium, fans will demand the quantity represented by bqfi and are willing to pay
the price represented by bpfi . Correspondingly, the sponsors will demand bqsi and pay bpsi for
each unit of advertisement in equilibrium.13
In order to build the intuition, we consider a scenario in which the sponsors and the
fans of club i have symmetric market potential - i.e., ms = mfi = mi > 0. In this scenario,
13Note that if the market potential of the sponsors is larger than that of the fans of club i, i.e., ms > mfi ,
we must bound ms from above such that ms < ms  m
f
i (2 nf)
nf ns in order to guarantee that bpfi > 0.
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equilibrium prices and quantities for sponsors and fans of club i = f1; 2g are given by
bqsi = bqfi = mi2   and bpsi = mi(1  ns)2   i, bpfi = mi(1  nf )2   i.
Note that due to the symmetry of the two markets, sponsors and fans of club i demand an
equal quantity bqfi = bqsi in equilibrium. We derive that stronger combined network e¤ects
 yield higher quantities for both fans and sponsors in equilibrium. This follows because
an increase in ns (i.e., either weaker negative or stronger positive sponsor-related network
externalities) yields increased combined network e¤ects and thus leads to an increase in
the demand of fans. In combination with the positive fan-related network externalities,
this induces an increase in demand on the part of sponsors. In contrast to the equilibrium
quantities, the equilibrium prices di¤er between fans and sponsors. Sponsors pay a higher
price in equilibrium than do fans - i.e., bpsi > bpfi for all nf > jnsj. Note that the price bpfi
for fans (bpsi for sponsors) is lower (higher), the stronger are the positive fan-related network
externalities nf , whereas the price bpfi for fans (bpsi for sponsors) is lower (higher), the lower
is ns.
Comparative statics for the general case with asymmetric market potential of fans and
sponsors lead to the following proposition:
Lemma 2 (i) Equilibrium quantities for fans and sponsors of club i increase with nf and
ns, i.e., @bqi =@nf > 0 and @bqi =@ns > 0 for  2 ff; sg. (ii) Given a certain quality of
the competition i equilibrium prices for fans (sponsors) of club i decrease (increase) with
stronger fan-related network externalities, i.e., @bpfi =@nf < 0 and @bpsi=@nf > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Part (i) of the lemma shows that the stronger are the positive fan-related network exter-
nalities nf , the higher is the equilibrium quantity demanded by fans and sponsors. If there is
a disutility of the sponsorsadvertisements for fans (ns < 0), then the equilibrium quantities
demanded by fans and sponsors decrease with stronger, i.e., more negative sponsor-related
network externalities. If, on the other hand, ns > 0, then the equilibrium quantities de-
manded by fans and sponsors increase with stronger, i.e., more positive sponsor-related
network externalities.
It follows that the equilibrium demands bqsi and bqfi are higher in a situation in which the
combined network e¤ects are positive than in a situation in which the combined network
e¤ects are zero. The intuition is as in the case with symmetric market potential above.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in ns leads to an increase in fan demand and consequently, due
to positive fan-related network externalities, to an increase in the demand of the sponsors.
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Note that fans of club i demand a higher quantity in equilibrium if their market potential is
larger than that of the sponsors, i.e., bqfi > bqsi , mfi > ms.
Part (ii) of the lemma shows that given a certain quality of the competition i the equilib-
rium price bpfi for the fans of club i is lower, the stronger are the positive fan-related network
externalities nf , whereas the opposite holds true for the equilibrium price bpsi for the sponsors.
This result is in accordance with the special case of symmetric market potentials. Relatively
stronger fan-related network externalities induce an increase in the demand function of the
sponsors and yield, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the prices for sponsors. Thus, if club i
decreases the price for the market with the stronger positive network externalities (in our
model the fan market), it enhances the positive e¤ect on revenues. It follows that due to the
positive network externalities exerted by the fans on the sponsors, a revenue-maximizing club
has an incentive to keep prices low on the market with the positive network externalities,
whereas in the market with relatively weaker positive or even negative network externalities
(the sponsor market), it has an incentive to charge higher prices.
Whether the equilibrium price for fans is higher than that for the sponsors depends on
the relationship between the market potential of fans and sponsors and the particular net-
work externalities. Formally, we derive bpfi < bpsi , mfi =ms < (1  ns) =  1  nf. Thus,
as long as the market potential of the fans relative to that of the sponsors is smaller than
(1  ns) =  1  nf, prices are higher in the sponsor market than in the fan market. Ceteris
paribus, a decrease in the fan-related network externalities renders the fan market less im-
portant (due to its weaker network externalities) and the right-hand side of the inequality
decreases such that the inequality may not be satised anymore. In this case, equilibrium
prices on the fan market may be higher than on the sponsor market. Note that if the market
potential of the sponsor market is higher than the market potential of the fan market for
club i (i.e. ms > mfi ) then independent of the network externalities, prices will be higher in
the sponsor market because (1  ns) =  1  nf > 1 for all 1 > nf > jnsj  0.
Furthermore, we derive from (8) and (9) that in a situation without network externalities
(i.e., nf = ns = 0), club i maximizes its revenue by making the quantity sold to fans directly
proportional to the quantity sold to sponsors with bqfi = (mfi =ms)bqsi .14 Finally, we see that
equilibrium prices for fans (sponsors) are lower (higher) in a situation with positive combined
network e¤ects than in a situation in which combined network e¤ects equal zero.
14Note that this relationship holds true also in a situation in which combined network e¤ects are zero.
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By substituting equilibrium prices and quantities of fans and sponsors from (8) and (9)
in the revenue function (6), we compute the revenue of club i as15
bRi = i  i = ixi(xi + 2xj)
(xi + xj)2
; (10)
with
i  (m
f
i )
2 + (ms)2 +mfim
s
(2  ) (2 + ) ; i = f1; 2g: (11)
In the next lemma, we derive some useful properties of the function i which will be exploited
in the subsequent analysis:
Lemma 3 We consider i() as a function of the combined network externalities  and
derive the following properties: 1() > 2() and @1()=@ > @2()=@ > 0.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
It follows from Lemma 3 that given a certain quality of competition equal for both clubs
- i.e., 1 = 2 - the revenue of the large club will be higher than the revenue of the small
club. Moreover, revenues for both types of clubs increase with stronger combined network
e¤ects, where the increase is stronger for the large club than for the small club.
4.2 Stage 1
In stage 1, club i maximizes its prots by anticipating the decisions made in stage 2. By
substituting club revenues (10) into the prot function (7), we derive the maximization
problem of club i = f1; 2g in stage 1 as
max
xi0
n
i = bRi(xi; xj)  cxio =  (mfi )2 + (ms)2 +mfims
(2  ) (2 + )
!
xi(xi + 2xj)
(xi + xj)2
  cxi; (12)
The rst-order conditions for this maximization problem yield16
@i
@xi
=
 
(mfi )
2 + (ms)2 +mfim
s
(2  ) (2 + )
!
2x2j
(xi + xj)3
  c = 0:
15The revenue function given by (10) satises the properties of the revenue function proposed by Szymanski
and Késenne (2004, p. 168).
16It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satised.
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Solving this system of equations, yields the equilibrium talent investments of clubs i = f1; 2g
in stage 1 as
bxi = 2ij i(i + 3j)  (ij)1=2(3i + j)
c(i   j)3 , (13)
with i =
(mfi )
2+(ms)2+mfim
s
(2 )(2+) and i; j = f1; 2g; i 6= j. Both types of clubs invest a positive
amount bxi > 0 in playing talent. Moreover, the large club invests more in talent than
does the small club (i.e., bx1 > bx2) because the marginal revenue of talent investments is
higher for the former type of club due to the larger market potential of its fans.17 Note that
the investments of both clubs are inuenced by the network externalities exerted by fans
and sponsors. Again, the extent to which fans and sponsors indirectly inuence each other
determines the decision of each club to invest in playing talent.
Substituting the equilibrium investments (13) in the CSF function (3) yields the following
equilibrium win percentages:
( bw1; bw2) =  1
1 + (12)1=2
;
2
2 + (12)1=2

: (14)
By analyzing the impact of network externalities on the win percentages, we can establish
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Stronger combined network e¤ects  induce the large (small) club to decrease
(increase) its win percentage in equilibrium and thus produce a more balanced league if and
only if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small. Formally, @ bw1=@ < 0 and
@ bw2=@ > 0, ms < bms  (mf1mf2)1=2.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The proposition shows that with a su¢ ciently small market potential of the sponsors, the
win percentage of the large (small) club is lower (higher), the stronger the positive network
externalities that operate from fans to sponsors are. A lower disutility or a higher utility of
the sponsorsadvertisements for the fans yields the same result. The intuition behind this
proposition follows: The di¤erence in market sizes for the two clubs regarding their fan base
yields that sponsor-related revenues are relatively more important to the small club than to
the large club. To attract sponsors, the small-market club increases its investment in talent
as combined network e¤ects increase, thereby increasing its win percentage. The potentially
negative impact of more sponsors on the attractiveness of the match to the fans is less impor-
tant to the small club. For the large-market club, the opposite rationale holds. Fan-related
revenues are relatively more important because of the larger market size. In equilibrium, it
17See Buraimo et al. (2007) who analyze how closely playing success is linked to market size in practice.
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is optimal for the large-market club to invest less in talent, as the revenue impact of less
sponsors overcompensates the potentially decreasing attractiveness of the match to the fans.
Consequently, with stronger combined network externalities competitive balance increases.
Thus, a league in which the positive fan-related network externalities are stronger than the
sponsor-related network externalities (in absolute value) may be characterized by a higher
degree of competitive balance than a league in which combined network e¤ects are zero. For
a su¢ ciently large market potential of the sponsors, the opposite holds true. In this case,
competitive balance decreases when combined network e¤ects increase.
Furthermore note that the quality of the competition bi in equilibrium can be expressed in
terms of i as bi = bwi+ bwi bwj = i(2j+(ij)1=2)(i+(ij)1=2)(j+(ij)1=2) : A direct consequence of Proposition
1 is that stronger network e¤ects imply a lower (higher) quality of competition for the large
(small) club if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small. Formally,
(@b1=@ < 0 and @b2=@ > 0), ms < bms.18
The impact of network externalities on club prots is established in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2 Stronger combined network e¤ects yield an increase in prots for the small
and the large club.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The proposition shows that the prots of the small and the large club increase if the
positive network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market
increase (or equivalently, through a weaker impact by sponsors advertisements on the
fans). Thus, the two types of clubs benet from stronger network e¤ects. To see the in-
tuition behind this result, remember that the prots of club i in equilibrium are given bybi = ibi   cbxi, and thus, the partial derivatives with respect to combined network e¤ects 
yield @bi=@ = (@i=@)bi + i(@bi=@)   c(@bxi=@). Through stronger combined network
e¤ects, both types of clubs face higher costs due to a higher investment level in playing talent.
On the other hand, stronger combined network e¤ects have a positive e¤ect on equilibrium
quantities (bqfi ; bqsi ) and prices (bpfi ; bpsi ) such that club revenues for both types of clubs increase.
The higher club revenues compensate for the higher costs, and thus, club prots increase.
Note that the positive e¤ect on club revenues due to stronger combined network e¤ects holds
true even though the quality of the competition bi will decrease for the large (small) club if
the market potential ms of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small (large).
18Note that the match quality for the large (small) market club decreases (increases) if and only if the
league becomes more balanced. As we know from Proposition 1, a more balanced (unbalanced) league
emerges in the case of su¢ ciently low (high) market potential on the part of the sponsors.
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5 Further Implications and Discussion
5.1 Competitive balance and network externalities
Research on competitive balance has not considered the inuence of network e¤ects so far,
i.e., the parameter  has been assumed to be zero. By integrating the existence of network
e¤ects into models of sports leagues, new policy measures for leagues and their governing
bodies emerge. For example, Proposition 1 suggests that network externalities potentially
a¤ect competitive balance when there is a limit on sponsoring activities. In particular,
if sponsors only dispose of a limited quota for advertisements ms < bms, competitive bal-
ance increases through stronger network externalities that operate from fans to sponsors (or
equivalently, through a weaker impact by sponsorsadvertisements on the fans).
The league and its clubs cannot manipulate the strength of the network externalities.
However, by controlling the market potential of the sponsors, they can make sure that the
network externalities operate in the desired direction. The market potential of the sponsors
is thus a crucial parameter to control the competitive balance in our league model. This
result will be emphasized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Competition in the league becomes more balanced when the market potential
ms of the sponsors increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The proposition shows that a possible measure for improving competitive balance is to
increase the market potential of the sponsors. For this to hold, however, the market potential
of the sponsors has to remain below the threshold given in Proposition 1, i.e., ms < bms.
Otherwise, stronger network e¤ects would have a negative impact on the competitive balance
in the league, and thus mitigate the positive e¤ect of an increased ms. An increase in the
market potential of the sponsors could be achieved, for instance, through an increase in the
quota for the amount of advertisements set by the league.
The intuition behind the result in Proposition 3 is that clubs generate revenues from fans
and sponsors, where the amount of sponsorship revenues also depends on the amount of fans
a¢ liated with a certain club (see Lemma 1). In equilibrium, the revenues generated from
the sponsorsadvertisements are higher for the large club than for the small club due to the
larger market potential from the fans of the large club. An increase in the quota for the
amount of advertising for the sponsors increases both clubsrevenues. Due to the decreasing
returns to scale of sponsorsadvertising, the increase in revenues, however, is stronger for
the small club than for the large club. It follows that the incentives to invest in playing
talent are higher for the small club than for the large club. This relative di¤erence causes
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the former type of club to increase its equilibrium talent investments more than the latter
type of club. As a result, the win percentage of the large (small) club decreases (increases)
and a more balanced league emerges.
5.2 Revenue sharing and network externalities
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of revenue sharing in the presence of network exter-
nalities. The sharing of revenues plays an important role in the redistribution of revenues
and has long been accepted as an exemption from antitrust law.19 The basic idea of such a
cross-subsidization policy is to guarantee a reasonable competitive balance in the league by
redistributing revenues from large-market clubs to small-market clubs because large-market
clubs have a higher revenue-generating potential than do small-market clubs (Atkinson et
al., 1988; Késenne, 2000, Szymanski and Késenne, 2004; Dietl, Lang and Rathke, 2010).
The current revenue-sharing schemes vary widely among professional sports leagues all over
the world. The most prominent is possibly that operated by the National Football League
(NFL), in which the visiting club receives 40% of the locally earned television and gate receipt
revenue. Major League Baseball (MLB) has a revenue-sharing agreement whereby all the
clubs in the American League put 34% of their locally generated revenue (gate, concessions,
television, etc.) into a central pool, which is then divided equally among all the clubs.
We introduce a pool revenue-sharing arrangement into our model. Under a pool-sharing
arrangement, club i receives an -share of its revenue Ri and an (1  )=2-share of a league
revenue pool Ri + Rj. The after-sharing revenues of club i, denoted by Ri , can be written
as:
Ri =  bRi + (1  )2 ( bRi + bRj);
with  2 (0; 1] and i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j. Note that a higher parameter  represents a league
with a lower degree of redistribution. Thus, the limiting case of  = 1 describes a league
without revenue-sharing.
The maximization problem of club i is thus given by
max
xi0
n
Ri (xi; xj) =  bRi(xi; xj) + (1  ) bRj(xi; xj)  cxio ; (15)
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. By solving this maximization and analyzing the e¤ect of  on
the equilibrium win percentages, we can establish the following proposition:
19Professional team sports leagues often nd themselves under antitrust surveillance (Flynn and Gilbert,
2001). Most revenue-sharing arrangements, however, have not been challenged in the courts because revenue
sharing is supposed to enhance competitive balance, and thus, is in the interest of the consumer (Szymanski,
2003).
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Proposition 4 In the presence of network externalities, revenue sharing always decreases
the competitive balance in the league. Network externalities, however, mitigate the negative
e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance if and only if the market potential ms of the
sponsors is su¢ ciently small with ms < bms.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
In accordance to other contest models of sports leagues with prot-maximizing clubs (e.g.,
Szymanski and Késenne, 2004; Grossmann, Dietl and Lang, 2010), the proposition shows
that revenue sharing produces a less balanced competition in a league in which positive
network externalities operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while negative
network externalities operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. A higher degree
of revenue sharing, i.e., a lower parameter , results in a higher win percentage for the large
club and a lower win percentage for the small club.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Revenue sharing has a negative e¤ect
on marginal revenue of both clubs in equilibrium. This so-called "dulling e¤ect" is more
pronounced for the underdog (small-market club) than for the dominant team (large-market
club). Due to the logit formulation of the CSF, the (positive) marginal impact on the
dominant teams revenues of a decrease in talent investment by the underdog is greater than
the (positive) marginal impact on the underdogs revenues of a decrease in talent investment
by the dominant team. As a result, the small club will reduce its investment level relatively
more than the large club such that the league becomes less balanced through revenue sharing.
Network externalities, however, can mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on
competitive balance. In particular, if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small
such that ms < bms then stronger combined network e¤ects reduce the di¤erences between
clubs in terms of win percentages and thus reduce the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on
competitive balance. In the opposite case, i.e., ms > bms, network externalities even reinforce
the dulling e¤ect such that the negative impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance
augments.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a contest model of a professional team sports league with
two market sides. The competition of the clubs is the platform between fans on one market
side and sponsors on the other market side. Positive network externalities operate from the
fan market to the sponsor market, and ambiguous network externalities operate from the
sponsor market to the fan market.
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Our analysis shows that a revenue-maximizing club has an incentive to keep prices low in
the market with relatively stronger positive network externalities and charge a higher price
in a market with relatively weaker positive or negative network externalities. In our model,
low prices on the fan market enhance the positive e¤ect on club revenues due to the positive
network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market. An increase
in the demand in the fan market leads (through positive fan-related network externalities)
to an increase in the demand on the sponsor market. High prices in the market with positive
network externalities would inhibit the positive e¤ect on club revenues.
We further derive that network externalities may crucially a¤ect competitive balance
in a sports league. In particular, we show that stronger combined network e¤ects induce
both clubs to increase their talent investments in equilibrium. If the market potential of
the sponsors is su¢ ciently small, the increase in talent investments of the small club will
be stronger than that of the large club because the small club benets more from stronger
network e¤ects than the large club. As a result, the win percentage of the small club
increases and the win percentage of the large club decreases in equilibrium, yielding a more
balanced league. With the introduction of a revenue sharing arrangement, our model shows
that network externalities can mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive
balance.
We conclude that it is important to incorporate network externalities into the analysis
of team sports leagues. Depending on the market potential of the sponsors, traditional
analyses of sports leagues that do not take network externalities into account may under- or
overestimate the actual level of competitive balance in a league. Based on these predictions,
traditional analyses may therefore suggest the wrong policy implications. For instance, they
may suggest the implementation of measures to increase competitive balance, which may not
be necessary because the league may already be su¢ ciently balanced. Finally, our model
suggests that both types of clubs benet from the presence of network externalities because
club prots always increase with stronger combined network e¤ects. This result holds true
even though costs increase for both types of clubs due to higher talent investments. The
higher club revenues, however, compensate for the higher costs, such that club prots always
increase.
Taking a closer look at major team sports leagues worldwide, one can nd a number
of phenomena that may be explained by our model. For example, the di¤erences in match
attendance and average ticket prices between national leagues in European football are ac-
companied by strong divergences in sponsor-related revenues. While match-day income (e.g.,
ticket sales and the like) makes up a higher percentage of revenues in the English Premier
League than in the German Bundesliga, sponsorship is far more important in the latter.
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This fact may mirror the trade-o¤ between fan-related and sponsor-related revenues. The
quota for sponsorship in many North American major leagues represents another example;
even though teams might be able to obtain higher revenues by increasing the amount of
sponsoring/advertisements, the majority of teams refrains from posting advertisements on
jerseys.20
Our model serves as a basic framework for the analysis of network e¤ects in team sports
leagues. There is a broad range of further applications and model extensions. For instance, an
interesting avenue for further research could be the application of our model to a league that
operates with restrictions (caps and oors) on player salaries. Payroll restrictions to improve
competitive balance and control costs are common in professional team sports leagues all
around the world. The implementation of such payroll restrictions in the model with network
externalities could yield further implications for the governance of team sports leagues.
20Note that teams in the National Football League (NFL) are allowed to post a sponsor on their jerseys.
Only a small proportion of teams, however, makes use of this opportunity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In stage 2, club i 2 f1; 2g maximizes its revenue Ri = pfi qfi + psiqsi , by taking the investment
decisions made in stage 1 as given. Formally, club i solves the following maximization
problem:21
max
(qfi ;q
s
i )0
Ri = p
f
i q
f
i + p
s
iq
s
i =
h
(mfi   qfi + nsqsi )qfi + (ms   qsi + nfqfi )qsi
i
i: (16)
The reaction functions of fans and sponsors are derived as
qfi (q
s
i ) =
1
2

mfi + (n
f + ns)qsi

and qsi

qfi

=
1
2

ms + (nf + ns)qfi

:
Note that there is a positive relationship between the quantities demanded by sponsors and
fans in equilibrium because if the combined network e¤ects are positive, i.e., nf + ns > 0.
Solving this system of reaction functions, yields the following equilibrium quantities for
club i bqfi = 2mfi +ms(2  ) (2 + ) and bqsi = mfi  + 2ms(2  ) (2 + ) :
Substitution into prices pfi =

mfi   bqfi + nsbqsi i and psi = ms   bqsi + nfbqfi  i yields
bpfi = mfi  2  nf+ms(ns   nf )(2  ) (2 + ) i and bpsi = mfi (nf   ns) +ms (2  ns)(2  ) (2 + ) i:
This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) In order to show that equilibrium quantities (bqfi ; bqsi ) for fans and sponsors of club i increase
(decrease) with stronger fan (sponsor) network e¤ects, we compute
@bqfi
@nf
=
@bqfi
@ns
=
4mfi  +m
s(4 + 2)
[(2  ) (2 + )]2 > 0 and
@bqsi
@nf
=
@bqsi
@ns
=
4ms +mfi (4 + 
2)
[(2  ) (2 + )]2 > 0;
for all mfi > 0, m
s > 0, 1 > nf  jnsj  0 and  2 [0; 2).
(ii) In order to show that, given a certain quality of the competition i, equilibrium prices
21In our setting it is an equivalent approach if clubs rst maximize revenues with respect to quantities
and then derive equilibrium prices or vice versa.
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bpfi for fans (bpsi for sponsors) of club i decrease (increase) with stronger fan-related network
e¤ects, we compute
@bpfi
@nf
=
mfi
 
ns2   4nf+ms 4 + (nf   3ns)
[(2  ) (2 + )]2 < 0;
@bpsi
@nf
=
msi
 
4nf   ns2+mfi 4 + (nf   3ns)
[(2  ) (2 + )]2 > 0;
for all mfi > 0, m
s > 0, 1 > nf  jnsj  0 and  2 [0; 2). This completes the proof of the
lemma.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that stronger network e¤ects induce the large (small) club to decrease (increase) its
win percentage in equilibrium if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently
small, we proceed as follows. We write @i()
@
= 0i(). According to Lemma 3, we know that
1() > 2() and 01() > 
0
2() > 0. Thus, we compute bw1=bw2 = 1()= [1()2()]1=2 > 1.
Now, we will show that @( bw1= bw2)
@
< 0 and thus @ bw1
@
< 0 and @ bw2
@
> 0:
@( bw1=bw2)
@
=
1() [
0
1()2()  1()02()]
2 [1()2()]
3=2
< 0, 1()
2()
>
01()
02()
:
With i() given by (11), it holds
1()
2()
=
(mf1)
2 + (ms)2 +mf1m
s
(mf2)
2 + (ms)2 +mf2m
s
and
01()
02()
=

mf1 + 2m
s

2mf1 +m
s


mf2 + 2m
s

2mf2 +m
s
 :
We conclude that 1()
2()
>
01()
02()
, ms < bms. This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
For expositional sake, we provide a formal proof for a linear revenue function. The proof for
a quadratic revenue function is mathematically equivalent but notational very cumbersome.
We therefore stick to the case of linear revenues. In case of linear revenues, the prot
function of club i is given by i = iwi   xi, such that the equilibrium investments bxi and
win percentages bwi yield
(bx1; bx2) =  212
(1 + 2)
2 ;
1
2
2
(1 + 2)
2

and ( bw1; bw2) =  1
1 + 2
;
2
1 + 2

:
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Equilibrium prots bi of club i are thus computed as bi = 2i1+2 : The derivative with respect
to network e¤ects  is given by
@bi
@
=
i()

(i() + 2j())
0
i()  i()0j()

(i() + j())
2 :
We derive @b1
@
> 0, 1() > 2() and 01() > 02() > 0, whereas @b2@ > 0, 21()+2()2() >
01()
02()
. However, one can show that the last inequality is always fullled for i given by (11),
in combination with mf1 > m
f
2 > 0, m
s > 0 and  2 [0; 2). This completes the proof of the
proposition.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that a larger market potential ms of the sponsors increases the competitive balance
in the league, we proceed as follows. We consider i(ms) =
(mfi )
2+(ms)2+mfim
s
(2 )(2+) as a function
of ms and write @i(m
s)
@ms
= 0i(m
s). We derive the following properties:
1(m
s)  2(ms) =

mf1  mf2

mf1 +m
f
2 +m
s

(2  ) (2 + ) > 0;
0i(m
s) =
mfi  + 2m
s
(2  ) (2 + ) > 0; and 
0
1(m
s) > 02(m
s):
for all mf1 > m
f
2 > 0;m
s > 0 and  2 [0; 2). We know that competitive balance can
be expressed in terms of i(ms) as bw1bw2 = 1(ms)[1(ms)2(ms)]1=2 > 1. Now, we will show that
@( bw1= bw2)
@ms
< 0 and thus @ bw1
@ms
< 0 and @ bw2
@ms
> 0:
@( bw1=bw2)
@ms
=
1(m
s) [01(m
s)2(m
s)  1(ms)02(ms)]
2 [1(ms)2(ms)]
3=2
< 0, 1(m
s)
2(ms)
>
01(m
s)
02(ms)
We derive
1(m
s)
2(ms)
=
(mf1)
2 + (ms)2 +mf1m
s
(mf2)
2 + (ms)2 +mf2m
s
and
01(m
s)
02(ms)
=
mf1 + 2m
s
mf2 + 2m
s
and can show that 1(m
s)
2(ms)
>
01(m
s)
02(ms)
holds for all ms > 0. We conclude that competitive
balance increases with a larger market potential of the sponsors, i.e., @( bw1= bw2)
@ms
< 0. This
completes the proof of the proposition.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The rst-order conditions of the maximization problem (15) are derived as
@Ri
@xi
= 
@ bRi
@wi
@wi
@xi
+
1  
2
 
@ bRi
@wi
@wi
@xi
+
@ bRj
@wj
@wj
@xi
!
  c = 0;
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a
maximum are satised. By combining the rst-order conditions of club i and j, and using
the adding-up constraint @wi
@xi
=  @wj
@xi
, we obtain"

@ bRi
@wi
  1  
2
 
@ bRj
@wj
  @
bRi
@wi
!#
@wi
@xi
=
"

@ bRj
@wj
  1  
2
 
@ bRi
@wi
  @
bRj
@wj
!#
@wj
@xj
;
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. By using (3) and (10), and after some rearrangements, we nd
that in equilibrium (bx1; bx2) it must hold
bx1 = (1  )(1   2) + [(1  )2(21 + 22) + 212(1 + (6 + )]1=22(1 + )2 bx2;
with i given by (11) and i 2 f1; 2g. It follows that the equilibrium win percentage of club
i is given by
bwi = i(1 + 3) + j(1  )  [(1  )2(21 + 22) + 212(1 + (6 + )]1=24(i   j) ;
with i given by (11) and i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j.
We further compute the partial derivative of bw1 with respect to  at  = 1 as @ bw1@ 
=1
=
 1+2 2
p
12
4(1 2) < 0, because 1 > 2. We conclude that a higher degree of revenue sharing
(i.e., a lower ) increases the win percentage of the large-market club 1 and consequently
decreases the win percentage of the small-market club 2. As a result, competitive balance
decreases which proves part (i) of the proposition.
To prove part (ii), we proceed as follows. We dene F () as the partial derivative of bw1
with respect to  at  = 1, i.e., F () :=
1()+2() 2
p
1()2()
4(1() 2()) , and we show
F 0() =
h
1() + 2()  2
p
1()2()
i
[1()
0
2()  01()2()]
4
p
1()2() [1()  2()]2
> 0, 1()
2()
>
01()
02()
As we know from the proof of Proposition 1, the last inequality is satised if and only if
24
ms < bms. We conclude that stronger combined network e¤ects  mitigate the negative e¤ect
of revenue sharing on competitive balance if and only if ms < bms. Note that numerical
simulations have shown that parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition hold for all parameters
 2 (0; 1].
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